In international relations (IR) it is usually accepted that there is a wide range of different theoretical approaches which try to provide a complete explanation for the dynamics of the international political system. Especially two approaches are commonly considered as providing the most powerful and most extensive insight and explanation in and for the conditions in the international system by “proposing causal explanations, describing events and explaining trends and phenomena” (Burchill, 1996, 13): Realism and liberalism.

Political realism, Realpolitik or power politics with its focus on “state power, national interests and unitary decision-making” is the oldest and most popular theoretical approach and as such has a “centrality […] in the international political thought of the West” (Moravcsik, 1992, 1). Liberalism as the seemingly counter philosophical tradition has emerged as a persistent and powerful approach over the last two centuries, having its roots in the European Enlightenment. The liberal thinking is usually considered as a more optimistic historic alternative to realism and e.g. promotes freedom, individual rights, constitutionalism and free market capitalism (Burchill, 2009, 57).

According to Morgenthau, the “history of modern political thought” is marked by a dramatic competition between these two approaches which “differ fundamentally in their conception of the nature of man, society and politics” (Morgenthau, 1967, 3). This resolute statement represents the common view that the ideas and approaches of both realism and liberalism are not compatible. However, in the late 1980s Waltz criticized classical realism and presented his notion of a structural realism, initiating a new current of realistic thought by seeing states as “units of the system (Baldwin, 3). Around the same time, neoliberalism as a market-driven approach to economic and social policy emerged, emphasizing economic interdependence. Both absolute positions have converged in the neorealism-neoliberalism debate so that it might be worthwhile to ask, whether those two most commonly accepted and influential theories are still mutually exclusive as it is perceived by Morgenthau for instance.

In a first part, this essay tries to give a general overview of the basic core assumptions of liberalism and realism. Based on the neoliberal-neorealism discussion, this essay tries in a second part to provide an answer to the question whether both currents are indeed mutually exclusive. Particularly the domain of cooperation between actors is analyzed. It is shown that both assume that the international sphere is anarchic and that both believe in the state as principal actor. They further claim that states follow certain interests and that gaining such interests can be facilitated through international regimes. However, the deductions neorealists and neoliberals draw from such common basic assumptions are usually completely different. The overall results that can be drawn from the question are eventually summarized in a conclusion.

Realism:

Realism is commonly viewed as the most dominant and oldest theory of IR, starting with the classical realism of Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli and later Morgenthau to structural realism whose major advocates are Rousseau, Waltz or Mearsheimer (Dunne; Schmidt, 2011, 90). It is therefore difficult to give one clear and overarching definition of realism as it differs in detail. However, several shared core concepts can be identified all realists would agree on. Such clear core ideas might have been best summarized by Dunne and Schmidt in the principles of statism, survival and self-help (Dunne; Schmidt; 2011, 86 – 88).

Realism is a particularly state-centric approach as the sovereign state is considered as the central actor in international politics as well as the legitimated representative of the society. In this context, one of the main realist arguments is the absence of an overarching central government/authority in the international sphere. Such condition of ‘anarchy’ leads to the consideration of each independent and sovereign state, that they are respectively the highest authority in the organizational structure of international politics. The absence of an overarching authority, however, forces states to follow primarily their own national interest of survival since the latter cannot be guaranteed. The logical consequence is, that “states with more power stand a better chance of surviving than states with less power” (Dunne; Schmidt, 2011, 87). This notion that each state actor is responsible for its own survival and progress and cannot rely on international institutions refers to the primacy of self-help. The constant threat to the national core interest of survival due to the anarchical structure of the system results in the augmentation of power capabilities of each state by e.g. “the development and use of military power” (Karle, 2003, 5) in order to secure its survival. Therefore, realism is often considered as a theory of power politics as its central claim is that the “acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy” (Evans; Newnham, 1998, 456). Such strong focus on the acquisition of (military) power and its constant increase, however, creates a security dilemma. When there is no overarching authority for protection as it is the case in the state of anarchy, states try to acquire more and more (military) power the more they fill threatened. The idea of the ‘balance of power’ provides a back door solution for such a situation and further represents an essential element of realism. If there is a preponderance of power by one state, others try to solve this security dilemma “both internally, by reallocating resources to national security, and externally, through alliances” (Burchill et. al, 2009, 37) in order to reestablish an equilibrium of power in which “no state is in a position to dominate all the others” (Dunne; Schmidt, 2011, 88).

Liberalism:

Liberalism is often perceived as the only true “persuasive and alternative view” (Karle, 2003, 6) of IR to realism and particularly experienced an enhanced influence in IR theory with the end of the Cold War. Especially Fukuyama claimed that the fall of the Soviet Union proved that the liberal concept of democracy is the only serious explanatory theory and the “final form of human government” (Burchill et. al, 2009, 58). Long before Fukuyama, however, Kant developed liberal core ideas in order to “abandon the lawless state of savagery” (Guyer, 2006, 482) and thus war. For Kant, the capability of every human being to develop reason was the key to freedom and justice so that he emphasized the “transformation of individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a federal contract between the states” (Dunne, 2011, 104). This refers to a second major principle of liberalism what Burchill calls the inside out approach to IR. According to Doyle “liberal democracies are uniquely willing to eschew the use of force in their relations with one another” (Linklater, 1993, 29). A ‘perpetual peace’ would be established as liberal-democratic polities and thus would “constitute an ideal which the rest of the world will emulate” so that all nations “would reciprocally recognize one another’s legitimacy” (Burchill, 2009, 59). For liberalists, peace is a fundamental question of a legitimate domestic and international order. Kant thus proposed republicanism in which “rulers were accountable and individual rights were respected”. Doyle continues this point by identifying individualism and its freedom as a further essential principle of liberalism. Individuals are considered as reasonable and ethical subjects which “generated rights and institutions” so that “liberalism calls for freedom […], freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law” (Doyle, 1996, 4) and property rights. Liberalism therefore starts with individuals and groups that act in both domestic and transnational society and which are thus the principal actors in the international system.

Beside democracy, liberalism claims that economics, social, ecological and other non-military issues promote cooperation among states. Liberalism particularly emphasizes the pacifying effects of free trade. As Angell suggests, war can become obsolete if trade flourishes between countries because trade brings mutual gains to all the actors, irrespective of how powerful they are. Moreover, free trade mitigates barriers and tensions between countries and propels interaction, friendship and understanding (Angell, 1910; Burchill, 2009, 60 – 65). Such notion of decaying barriers through commerce is a core element of the liberal modern interdependency theory. Transnational cooperation is considered as a requirement for resolving common problems. This argument particularly corresponds to the idea that the risk of conflicts between states is reduced by creating a common interest in trade and cooperation for the state’s mutual benefits. On the other hand, this refers to the claim of Keohane and Nye that the modern international system is marked by interdependence, creating a cobweb of diverse actors that are linked through interaction (Keohane; Nye, 2001). Therefore, the centrality of international institutions and regimes, (international) non-governmental organizations and other interest groups needs to be taken into account as they broaden the states’ “conception of self-interest” and wide “the scope for cooperation” (Burchill, 2009, 66). Moreover, liberalism argues that international institutions play an important role in implementing, monitoring and adjudicating disputes arising from decisions made by constituent states of the organization (Jervis, 1999).

Are Realism and Liberalism mutually exclusive Theories in the domain of cooperation?

Despite the common belief, some commonalities between the two theoretical approaches can indeed be identified, especially in the neorealism and neoliberalism debate. However, the deductions that are drawn from such similarities often differ greatly.

The first thing both theories start is the international system and the state. Neoliberals and neorealists agree that the international system is anarchic and consider this as a “fundamental premise about international politics” (Milner, 1991, 69). According to neorealists, anarchy is a result of missing international security mechanisms while neoliberals emphasize the lack of international mechanisms to enforce agreements as the reason for anarchy.

In this context, it needs to be mentioned that both approaches also emphasize the central position of the state although neoliberals follow a more pluralistic approach.  Neoliberals and neorealists agree that national security and economic welfare are important state goals. Neorealism however, prioritizes power, security and survival in the international anarchical system while neorealism tends to emphasize economic issues. This difference refers to their “differing estimates of the ease of cooperation” (Baldwin, 1993, 7). While neorealists argue that man by nature has a restless desire for power so that international politics is marked by a constant power play which makes cooperation much more difficult (Keohane, 1986, 211 – 212), especially liberal institutionalists contend that cooperation can be far more extensive than realists think. Neoliberals agree that it “is in the self-interest of each [state]” (Mingst, 2004, 64) to cooperate with others. The idea of cooperation as self-interest is based on the neoliberal view of state rationality, rational choice and game theory. Mingst explains such rationality with the prisoner’s dilemma[1](Mingst, 2004, 63 – 64). By alleging state rationality, liberal institutionalists “demonstrate that cooperation between states can be enhanced even without the presence of a hegemonic player which can enforce compliance with agreements” (Burchill, 2009, 66).  With reference to this, neoliberals argue that regimes[2] abate anarchy so that a “higher level of regularity and predictability” (Burchill, 2009, 66) to IR is reached, facilitating cooperation ultimately. Improved cooperation on the basis of regularity and predictability needs to be seen in conjunction with the expectations each actor has. According to the realist Krasner regimes constrain state behavior, “facilitate a convergence of expectations” (Krasner, 1983, 2) and thus an agreement. If it is predictable that enhanced cooperation through the establishment of certain regimes produces a wished outcome, then actors will implement such structures. This is “likely to be consistent with realist analysis” as regimes are “the product of the same factors – states’ interests and the constraints imposed by the system – that influence whether states should cooperate” (Jervis, 1999, 54).

Although both, neoliberals and neorealists agree that there is certain (institutional) cooperation in the international system they differ in terms of the outcomes of such cooperation. This leads to the major issue of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative gains’ in the neorealism-neoliberalism debate. Neorealists such as Waltz assume that states are more concerned with ‘relative gains’ from international cooperation as they feel insecure in the anarchical system and thus “must ask how the gain will be divided” and “who will gain more?” instead of “will both of us gain?” (Powell, 1994, 335). Neoliberals assume the latter and thus are concerned with ‘absolute gains’. This is however problematic, as the ‘relative’ and ‘absolute gains’ cannot always be separated from each other that easily. ‘Relative gains’ might be more important in security issues rather than economic affairs where ‘absolute gains’ might play a stronger role. Moreover, Baldwin contends that the question of ‘relative gains’ is difficult to answer as it “can be stated in terms of trade-offs between long- and short-term absolute gains” (Baldwin, 1993, 6). That there is no clear-cut between the gains is further emphasized by empirical case studies whose results supported both neorealist and neoliberal views. As Baldwin puts it, the case studies proved that there were “concerns about relative gains” but which were not “reflected in the policy outcomes” (Baldwin, 1993, 6). It might therefore be deduced, that the question of ‘relative’ and ‘absolute gains’ strongly depends on world political conditions. The identification of such conditions, however, remains difficult since states seeking for ‘relative gains’ and states seeking for ‘absolute gains’ might show similar behavior (Baldwin, 1993, 6). In this context, the zero-sum problem is a further step in the theory of cooperation by neoliberals and neorealists. In both realist and neoliberal theory power plays an important rule although it is less crucial for neoliberals. However, the deductions are again different. Neorealists contend that states will not cooperate with each other if the outcome is lesser than the outcome of the rival. Neoliberals however argue, that cooperation must not be a zero-sum game “as many states feel secure enough to maximize their own gains regardless of what accrues to others” (Burchill, 2009, 67). States do not always exclusively follow ‘relative gains’ and thus mutual benefits through cooperation are possible (Baldwin, 1993, 18 – 20).

Conclusion

In a first part this essay tried to present the basic core assumptions of the two most dominant and most influential IR theories, liberalism and realism. Realism might be best summarized by its core principles ‘statism’, ‘survival’ and ‘self-help’. Moreover, the realist perception of an anarchic international system and the constant reestablishment of equilibrium of power (‘balance of power’) are further major elements of this theory. Liberalism mainly emphasizes democracy and individual rights. It assumes the inside-out approach to IR and cooperation among states which is facilitated through international regimes and emphasized by the premise of free trade.

In a second part, it was sought to answer the question whether these two theoretical approaches differ so greatly from each other in their views, perceptions, approaches and actions, particularly in the domain of international cooperation, so that they are indeed mutually exclusive. Based on the neoliberal-neorealist debate it was shown that both agree on basic assumptions such as anarchy, state centrism, the pursuance of interests and even on cooperation with other actors. However, there is a great divergence between them in the deductions they draw in further steps. Although both admit that there is cooperation despite anarchy and egoism, neoliberals claim that cooperation can be far more extensive than realists assume even though they agree on the self-interest principle of each actor. In contrast to neorealists, they allege state rationality which enhances cooperation. Such rational principles are further emphasized in their support for international regimes as they enhance regularity and predictability. In the context of cooperation and outcomes the issue of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative gains’ divides neoliberals and neorealists, too. The latter accentuate ‘relative gains’ while neoliberals stress out ‘absolute gains’. However, it was then illustrated that there is no clear-cut between both gains. In reality, states might show similar behavior and thus a clear division is not possible. In a final step this was underlined by the zero-sum problem.

Ultimately, it can be concluded that the neorealism-neoliberalism debate more and more challenges the traditional views of liberalism and realism as completely irreconcilable approaches. Keeping in mind their basic shared starting points it is tempting to agree with Nye and Herz who propose that they “are more properly regarded as complementary rather than competitive approaches to international affairs” (Baldwin, 1993, 24).

Bibliography:

1. Angell, Norman: ‘The Great Illusion’, London: Heinemann, 1910.
2. Baldwin, David: ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate’, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
3. Burchill, Scott et. al: International Relations: Theory and Practice. London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1996.
4. Burchill, Scott et. al: Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009.
5. Doyle, Michael: ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, in Brown, Michael; Lynn-Jones, Sean; Miller, Steven [eds], Debating the Democratic Peace, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.
6. Dunne, Tim: ‘Liberalism’, in The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, J. Baylis, S. Smith, P. Owens [eds], pp. 100 – 113, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011.
7. Dunne, Tim; Schmidt, Brian: ‘Realism’, in The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, J. Baylis, S. Smith, P. Owens [eds], pp. 84 – 99, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011.
8. Evans, G.; Newnham, J.: ‘The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations’, Penguin Books, London, 1998.
9. Guyer, Paul: ‘The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy’, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
   1. Jervis, Robert: ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’ in International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 42 – 63, 1999.
   2. Karle, Warren: Realism and Liberalism continue to shape the ways in which policy makers conceptualize international relations, Australian Public Service Center, Shedden Working Papers Series, 2003.
   3. Keohane, Robert: ‘Neorealism and its Critics’, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
   4. Keohane, Robert; Nye, Joseph: ‘Power and Interdependence’, New York: Longman, 2001.
   5. Krasner, Stephen: ‘International Regimes’, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983.
   6. Linklater, Andrew: ‘Liberal Democracy, Constitutionalism and the New World Order’ in Leaver, R.; Richardson, J. [eds], The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses, London, 1993.
   7. Milner, Helen: ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique’ in Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 67 – 85, 1991.
   8. Mingst, Karen: ‘Essentials of International Relations’, New York: W.W. Norton, 2004.
   9. Moravcsik, Andrew: Liberalism and International Relations Theory, Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series 92-6, Harvard University, 1992/rev. 1993.
   10. Morgenthau, Hans: Politics Among Nations, New York: Afred A. Knopf, 1967.
   11. Powell, Robert: ‘Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate Neorealism and its Critics’ in International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 313 – 344, 1994.

Background and Objectives of Study

It is especially a phenomenon of the second half of the 20^th century that societies all over the world have overthrown dictatorships and toppled other totalitarian regimes – especially in Latin America, East Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa – initiating a phase of transition towards free­dom and democracy. One elementary political and ethical question that results from such radical upheavals and with which such societies are confronted is how to deal with the lega­cies of repression and illiberal rule. As societies look back, try to understand a collec­tive fail­ure and to find solutions for dealing with a period of violence, they will have to deal with fun­damental issues in the areas of law, politics and morality such as the deficits in the rule of law and democratic governance and justice in order to reach sustainable peaceful co­existence and reconciliation. The necessity to resolve such questions and issues led to the de­velopment of the concept of transitional justice which has grown during the last decades to a normalized and globalized form of intervention in post-conflict situations in which such is­sues often tended to remain unsolved.[1] Recent upheavals in the Arab World and in Côte d’Ivoire (CI) show the importance and necessity of transitional justice as the countries already are confronted with the societies’ requests of how to deal with the legacies of the former re­pressive regimes. While there are several judicial approaches of transitional justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) represent one non-judicial concept which became more and more prominent during the last decades and which was already announced to be imple­mented by the new president of CI, Ouattara.

This study discusses approaches of transitional justice in the context of the post-conflict situa­tion of Cote d’Ivoire (CI). In a first chapter, the theoretical context and fundament of transi­tional justice is reviewed and in a second part the non-judicial approach of a TRC will be dis­cussed in the context of CI. Particularly it will be assessed to what extent, under which condi­tions and in which forms a TCR, can be established so that it achieves most effect and impact on reconciliation of the society by working up atrocities of the past civil war.[2]

Introduction and Bibliographical Overview

Walter Benjamin is one of the most famous twentieth century German literacy and cultural critic and known in the fields of humanities, cultural studies, media theory and art history. Benjamin was born in 1892 to a Jewish upper middle class family. His father was a successful art dealer and antiquarian. He absolved his studies in philosophy, art history and German studies at the Humboldt University of Berlin successfully and decided upon an academic career. Although Benjamin researched ambitiously, he soon encountered a decisive academic caesura: The Goethe University of Frankfurt rejected his postdoctoral thesis “The Origins of German Tragedy” as incomprehensible.[1]

When Hitler came to power and the persecutions of Jewish people started such occurrences represented another decisive private caesura in the life of Walter Benjamin. As a consequence of the events in Germany, Benjamin decided to immigrate to Paris in 1933 where he worked for Horkheimers “Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung” from 1934 onwards. In 1936 Benjamin published his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” which is until today his most famous book beside the “Arcades Project”.[2]

“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” represents a media theoretical and cultural policy analyse whose main thesis is that the uniqueness of a work of art or art itself and its reception gets destroyed by modern technical reproduction methods. Such new technical reproduction methods are especially a phenomenon of modern industrialisation and notably capitalism. Moreover, especially the invention of photography and film which had a breakthrough in the first half of the twentieth century and which were since then accessible for a broad audience, changed the perception of a work of art tremendously and strongly contributed to the destruction of its uniqueness. However, this is not only due to modern technical reproduction but also due to a different collective depiction of reality and thus due to a changed collective perception. Ultimately, a work of art loses its “Aura” – a decisive term/idea in Benjamins’ essay. As a further consequence the social function of media in general changes. According to Benjamin, the new collective aesthetics which is a result of modern reproduction offers the opportunity of an emancipatory politicisation of the masses on the one hand, but on the other hand this also hides the danger of political adsorption. This needs to be seen in the historical context of Walter Benjamin as the arising fascism successfully abused such danger.[3]

The rise of fascism in Europe was the political backdrop of Benjamin’s essay – and it was also his death sentence. When Nazi-Germany defeated France, Benjamin tried to flee to the United States of America but was stopped at Portbou in Spain which was under the control of the fascistic Franco Regime. When his passage was refused, Benjamin committed suicide with an overdose of morpheme for fear of falling into the hands of the Gestapo. Benjamin’s friend Berthold Brecht called his death the first real loss that Hitler had caused to German literature.[4]

While Benjamin was never able to secure academic employment during lifetime he represents one of the most important German intellectuals in the domains of Marxist aesthetic and cultural criticism today. This assignment aims at giving a brief summary and overview over the main aspects of Walter Benjamins “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”. Especially central aspects of the essay shall be elucidated: The withering of the ‘aura’ and the change of art perception through photography and film which leads to a loss of the ‘aura’ of a certain work of art, too. Both occurrences are a phenomenon of the modern age and are a result of modern technical reproduction methods according to Benjamin. Considering such explanations, it is tried to explain the conjunction between modern reproduction methods, the withering of the ‘aura’, art and politics in Fascism as emphasized by Benjamin. Furthermore, Benjamin’s term of the ‘aura’ was not free of critics and Theodor Adorno, beside Brecht maybe one of the most known friends of Benjamin during his lifetime, did criticize Benjamin’s idea and understanding of the ‘aura’. Therefore, the criticism of Adorno and how his understanding differentiates from the one Benjamins regarding the term ‘aura’ shall be treated and elucidated at last.

Based on the evaluated aspects and on the critical considerations of Benjamins’ “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, the outcomes are summarised and a conclusion is drawn.

Introduction and Political Background

Between 1980 and 1991, El Salvador[1] went through a violent civil war which broke out when the introduction of new agricultural and social reforms failed. The reforms aimed at changing the unequal ownerships in the countryside and at the limitation of power of the small but mighty “cof­fee oligarchy”[2]. Thus the civil war was primarily a social class war fuelled by economic in­equality and corrupt political elite. The Salvadorian military suppressed all (pre­ceding) at­tempts to limit the power of this small elite group. As it became clear in 1980 that the latest striving for reform failed, five communist and revolutionary groups joined to a coa­lition named “Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional” (FMLN; National Li­be­ration Front Farabundo Martí). In 1981, the FMLN called up the people of El Salvador for an armed rebellion against the Salvadorian regime. The following civil war cost approx­imately 75,000 lives and led to the displacement and emigration of roughly 1.2 million people out of a population of six million.[3] Under the patronage of the United Nations and in cooperation with the Colombian, Spanish, Mexican and Venezuelan Governments, peace negotiations started in 1988 / 1989. In the following three years tough negotiations between the FMLN and the Sal­vado­rian Government led to the signature of several agreements in order to achieve peace. In the contracts, the parties agreed on reformation of the military and of the police, the im­provement of the legal and elec­toral system, as well as the official acknowledgement of Human Rights. By mediation of the United Nation (UN) Secretary-General at that time Javier Pérez de Cuéllar an extensive peace agreement called “Acuerdos de Chapultepec” (Agreement of Chapultepec) was signed on Jan­uary 16, 1992. The first post civil war elec­tions in March 1994 was won by the Nationalist Re­publican Alliance with 68% of the votes and Afredo Cristiani who was president since 1989, kept his position.[4]

Between 1979 and 1993, eleven Latin American countries passed through a transition from authoritarian to democratic governance – usually accompanied by civil violence. Every so­ciety that goes through a period of violence will sooner or later face the diffi­cult challenge of how best to deal with the past. Seven of these countries have used a Truth Commission (TC) to work up the committed crimes[5]. Based on a proposal of the UN, the peace agreement of El Salvadorforesaw the establishment of a TC to examine the “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980…” committed by the Government and the FMLN “…and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth”[6]. The TC was called the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (Comisión de la Verdad Para El Salvador, CVES) and operated between July 1992 and March 1993.

This paper examines and describes the cooperation between the CVES and international, na­tional and regional actors. Subsequent to the provision of elementary background information about TC’s, this assignment critically reviews the cooperation of international actors such as the United Nations, the USA and the Organization of American States with the CVES. After­wards, the nature of cooperation with the El Salvadorian Government, the military, the Su­preme Court and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as national actors will be investigated. An assessment to what extent civil rights organizations as national actors coope­rated with the CVES and how the TCs staff and its appointment were linked to it will follow. The (catholic) church, as it is an important national and a regional actor, and its cooperation with the CVES is presented in the following chapter which completes the framework of ex­amination. Based on such analyses it will finally be elucidated and demonstrated that there was extensive cooperation such as with the UN for instance; though, occasionally cooperation did not take place in an adequate way, especially with the Government and the military.

Abstract:

Introduction and Political Background

Between 1980 and 1991, El Salvador[1] went through a violent civil war which broke out when the introduction of new agricultural and social reforms failed. The reforms aimed at changing the unequal ownerships on the countryside and at the restriction of the small but mighty “cof­fee oligarchy”[2] so that the civil war was primarily a social class war fuelled by economic in­equality and a corrupt political elite. The Salvadorian military suppressed all (preceding) at­tempts to limit the power of this small elite group. As it became clear in 1980 that the latest striving for a reform failed, five communist and revolutionary groups joined together to a coalition named “Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional” (FMLN; National Li­beration Front Farabundo Martí). In 1981, the FMLN called up the people of El Salvador for an armed rebellion against the Salvadorian regime. The following civil war cost approx­imately 75,000 lives and led to the displacement and emigration of roughly 1.2 million people out of a population of six million.[3]

Under the patronage of the United Nations and in cooperation with the Colombian, Spanish, Mexican and Venezuelan Governments peace negotiations already started between 1988 and 1989. In the following three years of tough negotiations between the FMLN and the Salvado­rian Government several agreements were signed in order to reach peace and in which they agreed on reformation of the military and the police, the improvement of the legal and elec­toral system, as well as the official acknowledgement of Human Rights. By mediation of the United Nation (UN) Secretary-General at that time Javier Pérez de Cuéllar an extensive peace agreement called “Acuerdos de Chapultepec” (Agreement of Chapultepec) was signed on Jan­uary 16, 1992. The first post civil war election in March 1994 was won by the Nationalist Re­publican Alliance with 68% of the votes and Afredo Cristiani who was president since 1989, kept his position.[4]

Between 1979 and 1993, eleven Latin American countries passed through a transition from authoritarian to democratic governance. But every society that goes through a period of crimes against humanity will sooner or later face the diffi­cult challenge of how best to deal with the past if it enters a phase of transition. Seven of these countries have used a Truth Commission (TC) to work up the committed crimes[5].

Based on a proposal of the UN, the peace agreement also included the establishment of a TC to examine the “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980…” committed by the Government and the FMLN “…and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth”[6]. The TC was called the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (Comisión de la Verdad Para El Salvador, CVES) and operated between July 1992 and March 1993.

This paper examines whether the CVES failed in its main objectives or whether its work re­sulted in some sustainable and positive effects for El Salvador. Subsequent to the provision of some elementary background information about TC’s this assignment critically reviews the procedures of implementing the recommendations listed in the CVES’s final report[7], and dis­cusses especially the reformation of the legislative, executive and judicative branches, the official acknowledgement of the crimes and the victims by the Government and armed forces, the amnesty law and the paying of the reparations. Based on the assessment of the mode how recommendations of the CVES were implemented this analysis will elucidate that the CVES indeed partly failed but has also reached significant successes.

Diese Strukturen gehen noch auf ein biologistisch determiniertes Frauenbild zurück das Natur mit Frau und Kultur mit Mann assoziier. Dieser Sachverhalt wird im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit über die Stellung der Frau in der konventionellen Landwirtschaft untersucht, in der es schein­bar eine klare geschlechtsspezifische Arbeits- und Rollenverteilung gibt, die Landwirtinnen mit „leichten“ Arbeiten und der Reproduktionssphäre verbinden und Landwirte mit „schwe­ren“ Arbeiten und der Produktionssphäre. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit geht es auch um das Selbstbild von Land­wirtinnen, dass durch die Doppelbelastung Hof und Haushalt geprägt ist und die Entwicklung einer eigenständigen und selbstbewussten Identität beeinflusst. Dieser Sachverhalt soll den zweiten Teil der Arbeit einleiten, der die Veränderung der Stellung der Frau durch die biolo­gische Landwirtschaft untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass die sonst als negativ erachtete Na­tur/Frau Zuordnung durch „organic farming“ eine deutliche Aufwertung erfährt, da diese mit den Prinzipien der Biodiversität und Nachhaltigkeit in der biologischen Landwirtschaft asso­ziiert werden. Weiterhin erfordert „Bio“ ein hohes Maß an Fachwissen und besonderer Fähig­keiten wodurch das Bildungsniveau steigt, welches sich wiederum positiv auf Akzeptanz und Ansehen der Landwirtinnen auswirkt. In der Zusammenfassung wird der Schluss nahegelegt, dass sich „Bio“ auch auf die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter positiv auswirkt und die traditi­onell-patriarchalischen Strukturen verändert, obwohl regionale und kulturelle Differenzen vorhanden sind.

Explications:

-       Les forêts ne pouvaient plus repousser, Ces espaces devinrent un désert gigantesque bien connu de nos jours sous le nom de « Sahara ».

-       La première explication implique que la ville était lieu quelque part en l’Afrique du Nord d’aujourd’hui à la côte. Plus précisément, à la côte de la mer méditerranée car la crevasse gigantesque qui se forma entre l’Europe et l’Afrique se remplit avec l’eau salée.

-       L’essai du dragon pour réparer les destructions entraina une forte collision entre l’Europe et l’Afrique. Cette collision de nouveau conduisit à la formation des Alpes.

-       En plus, on vit jamais un dragon en ce monde? Non. Par contre les belettes, elles, existent encore…

A first major difference between a TC and a CP is diverse history and tradition. The first CPs were already developed in ancient Greece, the birthplace of democracy, although the CPs at that time were not yet the CPs we know from today. Their authority was usually limited and their methods of conviction were dubious at best. However, they established themselves as important pillars in states and have played a major role in societies since the days of the Roman Empire. The CPs’ golden age started at the end of the 18^th century when the concept of nation-states, the separation of powers into a legislative, executive and judicature and the rule of law became more and more prominent. Unfortunately, there were dark periods in the past when law was either abused and changed or abolished as happened during the German Third Reich or in the Soviet Union and China under the reigns of Stalin or Mao. However, CPs which interpret and apply the law in order to carry out the administration of justice in accordance with the rule of law, have established themselves as indispensable, reliable and trustworthy instruments of justice which ameliorated their way of just prosecution and punishment to a maximum. They are instruments of justice with a long tradition and history whereas TCs are inventions of the present time. They were developed during the 1970s as new instruments to work up atrocities of war. However, their concept was not prominent until the mid-1980s even though the first TC was already implemented in 1974 in Uganda. Like the CPs, they suffered under teething troubles, too, as their mandate and authority was often only limited or that they did not enjoy an adequate treatment by the respective country they were established in. The first globally recognized TC was set up in 1983 in Argentina for investigating the mass killings and kidnappings under the previous military dictatorship. Since this time, they have been established worldwide and became more and more prominent for investigating human rights violations. Probably the most prominent examples are the TC’s in Chile investigating the Pinochet-era and the South African TC which investigation the crimes committed during the apartheid-era. Until today, 51 TC’s were established in opposite to CPs as thousand of proceedings are held every year in most countries worldwide.

A second decisive difference between a TC and a CP is their particular concentration on victims or perpetrators respectively. In order to work up a particular period of violence of a country, a CP usually focuses on the perpetrators, individuals that have committed serious war crimes and specific cases of crimes against human rights for which evidence is available. The conviction of perpetrators, aimed at bringing juridical justice, is the main focus and interest of a CP. In this context, a CP concentrates its attention on the perpetrators and tries to prosecute and to sentence those, who are mainly responsible for war crimes. However, it is not unusual that most of high-level perpetrators get off scot-free so that the satisfaction of victims often remains unanswered. Therefore, a TC is particularly victim-centered and as such represents a host-like status towards victims. It is the only instrument that represents a place where victims can tell their stories, views, needs and experiences as they are heard and their stories are noted down in public or private hearings. TCs can thus help victims to assimilate their experiences easier. The recording of the victims’ stories can also help to determine potential perpetrators and to prosecute them through the testimony of victims. As a further step, telling ones story can lead to a judicial conviction as well. Furthermore, the possibility for victims to tell their story can result in a societal acknowledgement of the victim’s faiths, which again might lead to a better reintegration of them in the society. Normally, victims then have much better chances to claim a (financial) compensation for their faiths due to an official acknowledgement.

However, only official CPs actually have the juridical power to prosecute, and to sentence perpetrators effectively and to ensure that they get a just punishment. In a democratic society, a CP is by a state legitimized, independent organ – separation of powers is an essential keyword– whose task is to investigate the guilt of an accused person and, if there is proved evidence for the person’s guilt, to sentence such a person in a just way. Consequently, it is equipped with particular measures through its legitimated juridical power. Due to its officially legitimated character, a CPs decisions and judgments are nationwide valid as it considers only the facts and evidences without prejudices or the influence of emotions, although a CPs decision can be contested in through higher authorities. In this context, a CP tries to guarantee that everyone enjoys the same rights and an objective treatment. TCs merely have a “moral” but no legal power to convict perpetrators as they are no judicial bodies, although their establishment is usually based on an extensive mandate authorized by the respective state. A TCs “moral” power consists of the occasion to drop names, which means that names of perpetrators for whose committed crimes absolute evidence is available are published and are made open to anybody. Usually, such names are “dropped” in the final report which a TC normally publishes and which documents its results. Such name-dropping can lead to public denunciation and conviction by the society through societal sanctions such as the exclusion and disregard of perpetrators. Furthermore, it needs to be mentioned, that usually only names of high-level perpetrators are published because they normally come-away scot-free and without any punishment. However, neither it is ensured that naming names lead to further investigations and prosecutions or that the recommendations given in the final report will be realized adequately nor that the application of a lynch law to named perpetrators by parts of the populations is prevented. In this context, a TCs decisions and judgments do not have the legitimated power to prosecute or to realize their decisions on its own in contrast to a CP.

As a CP particularly focuses on the perpetrators, its main task is to sentence the accused individual with their legal power and therefore bring juridical justice. In most cases, CPs were developed to concentrate their attention mainly on individuals and specific cases where crimes have been committed and for which absolute evidence is available. Juridical justice is significant for a country’s stability as a just CP not only represents a pillar of democracy but also gives a population the consciousness to be secured by a functioning judicature that ensures ones rights. However, the procedure of legal proceedings was not constructed to prosecute, hear and convict as many cases as possible. Even if they would be, not even all the courts in Chile, for instance, would have been sufficient to hear all the cases of committed crimes during the brutal dictatorship of Pinochet and to pronounce a verdict for all of them. The suitability of a CP to really cope sufficiently and in an extensive way with committed crimes during a particular period is therefore dubious, whereas a TC might have the necessary far-sightedness to cope with the legacy of a period of crimes in a sustainable way. While a common CPs aim is the prosecution of individuals, it is not the primary objective of a TC as it mainly concentrates on victims, their stories and their acknowledgement and reintegration in the society. Therefore, a TC more has the societal collective in its vision. This means, primarily, that the publication of the victims’ testimonies and thus the spreading of the absolute truth might result in an extensive acknowledgement of the victims and their faiths as well as it might result in an acknowledgement of the committed crimes of a former regime. This leads to an increased awareness of the committed wrongs of a society. Feelings of guilt result in a new consciousness of a society to correct and to improve former bad situations in order to reach an extensive social solidarity and reconciliation. Ultimately, the reintegration of victims and low-level perpetrators in the society is a decisive step to reach this. As a second consequence a TCs aim for a united collective which is based on a correction of a historiography of an affected country. A truthful writing of history is decisive for a country’s dealing with new critical situations that threat the (democratic) political system as it emphasizes social balance, solidarity and claims for reconciliation. ´

Some say that TCs have contributed to truth, justice, reparation, reform and reconciliation significantly and thus have earned a justifiable privileged place in the arsenal of responses to mass atrocities while others on the other hand emphasize that TCs are important but only are a sort of second-best deterrent measures and that court proceedings are more acknowledged and thus effective and just. While there is disagreement among the specialized literature, I, personally, think that TCs are much more than a second-best measure to cope with the legacy of war atrocities. Effective and just court proceedings or better said a well functioning judicature as an instrument to bring judicial justice is an absolute necessity in a society transitioning to a fully developed democracy. CPs are suitable measures to cope former war atrocities by prosecuting and convicting high-level perpetrators. They are, however, unsuitable if viewed in a broader societal context. CPs do not aim at a societal reconciliation or an extensive spreading of the full truth or the rectification of the societies views of the happenings in the past and especially they do not concentrate on the victims. TCs usually try to correspond to all of those criteria. In my opinion it is decisive that they are victim-centered and as such represent a place where their voices are heard. The conviction of perpetrators is necessary to keep the balance within a society but the victims themselves are not heard in an appropriate way all too often. Therefore, TCs indeed have earned a justifiable privileged place in coping with consequences of war atrocities. With regard to this, it is questionable why TCs have not yet become a more common tool to cope with the legacy of a period of war.